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OPTIMIZING THE WIDE SPECTRUM OF LEGAL OPTIONS
For many years, the issue of the legal form of the new climate agreement 
has hovered over the international negotiations. Countries have insisted 
on first discussing substance. Indeed, it is here that the main divergences 
remain. However, one year out from the Paris climate conference, it is 
time to open the discussion on the legal form of the final agreement. The 
issue of legal form is often reduced to the negotiation of a ‘binding’ or 
‘non-binding’ agreement. The bindingness of an international environ-
mental agreement however depends on multiple parameters. We propose 
four parameters to be considered: the form of the core agreement; the 
‘anchoring’ of commitments; mechanisms for transparency, accountabil-
ity and facilitation; and mechanisms for compliance. Parties should assess 
pros and cons of these options, and the agreement be optimised across all 
four. 
COMBINING FLEXIBILITY AND CREDIBILITY
Negotiations appear to be heading towards a hybrid agreement. Some pro-
visions would be contained in a core agreement, and some in implement-
ing documents such as decisions or schedules. This structure can help to 
balance legal certainty with flexibility. The core agreement should con-
tain a binding provision to implement and regularly update a ‘nationally 
determined contribution’ (NDC). If these NDCs were to be housed outside 
the agreement, this could give more flexibility on their content, submis-
sion and updating. The core agreement should contain strong provisions 
on transparency, accountability and facilitation, including independent 
institutional arrangements (a Transparency Committee). At this stage in 
global cooperation and given inherent weaknesses in international envi-
ronmental law, a punitive compliance mechanism seems unfeasible. How-
ever, the agreement should contain a compliance mechanism regarding 
procedural obligations, such as submission and updating of NDCs.
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1. iNtroDUctioN
Parties to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have agreed to 
negotiate a new climate agreement by the end of 
2015. The mandate for these negotiations sets out a 
certain number of parameters that the new agree-
ment should reflect. 
The agreement should be:
1. Adequate: the Paris agreement will be “un-
der the Convention”, i.e. respecting the prin-
ciples and objectives of the Convention. This 
includes in particular the ultimate goal of the 
Convention as described in Article 2 and sub-
sequently elaborated in 2010 under Decision 1/
CP.16, namely to hold warming to below 2 de-
grees Celsius. Achieving this level of mitigation 
will require widespread participation, a robust 
and credible regime, and a dynamic approach to 
increasing ambition over time.  
2. Universal and fair: the Paris agreement will 
be “applicable to all”, i.e. attracting the broad-
est possible participation consistent with the 
global nature of climate change, and reflect-
ing the principle of common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
(CBDR&RC) “under the Convention”. 
3. Legally robust: the Paris agreement will 
be “a multilateral, rules based regime”, in par-
ticular a regime grounded in a “protocol, an-
other legal instrument or an agreed outcome 
with legal force”. Since Parties have agreed at 
COP 19 in Warsaw that their contributions to 
this instrument would be determined at the na-
tional level, it is crucial that the instrument is 
effective. 
4. Dynamic and durable: many Parties have ex-
pressed the need to have an instrument that can 
be strengthened progressively over time, without 
burdensome renegotiation. The instrument to be 
adopted at COP 21 in Paris should balance the 
need for flexibility, experimentation and innova-
tion, with the need for credibility and ambition 
of the instrument and nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs).1 
As implied by the options listed in point three 
above, there are still some open questions regard-
ing the legal nature of the 2015 agreement and of 
its constituent elements. Achieving the four broad 
objectives listed above will require a careful and 
comprehensive approach to legal form, maximiz-
ing synergies, and balancing any potential trade-
offs between objectives. 
The objective of this paper is to provide an 
overview of key aspects of the new agreement’s 
legal form, the options available, and the poten-
tial interactions between them. It is structured as 
follows: Section 2 sets out the conceptual frame-
work, Section 3 addresses the form of the agree-
ment itself, and Section 4 discusses the options for 
anchoring NDCs in the new agreement. Section 5 
then discusses the issue of transparency and fa-
cilitation of action, and Section 6 discusses com-
pliance and enforcement. The conclusion summa-
rizes the main lines of argument.
2. tHe coNcePtUal FrameWorK
2.1. Clarification of the 
terminology from a 
legal point of view 
This paper discusses the options for the legal form 
of the instrument to be adopted at COP 21 in Paris. 
However, before entering into this discussion, it is 
necessary to clarify some key concepts upfront. 
mm Legal norm: “legal” is an adjective “qualifying 
substantives to indicate that they have a relation 
1. As is noted throughout this paper, there is still 
disagreement about the exact legal nature of the 
mitigation ‘contributions’, and other contributions, 
in the 2015 agreement. Following current negotiation 
practice, we therefore use the term ‘nationally 
determined contributions’ without prejudice to their 
eventual legal form. 
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to the Law”.2 From that perspective, a legal norm 
or standard can be distinguished from a moral, 
social, ethical or religious norm or standard. 
However, a legal norm does not necessarily have 
a binding character or legal force. 
mm “Legally binding”: a norm is legally binding 
only when it creates a legal obligation. In in-
ternational public law, a legally binding norm 
provides for a legal link whereby a subject of 
international law can be bound vis-à-vis others 
to adopt a determined behaviour.3 This is the 
case when a norm finds its origin in a formal 
source of international law (i.e.: treaty, custom-
ary rules, general international law principles, 
unilateral acts). Apart from the formal source 
of the legal norm, it is important to examine its 
content. Legal obligations in international trea-
ties and agreements, although legally binding 
in form, are often so softly worded, contingent 
or conditional, as to be devoid of real normative 
force. This issue of the content of legally binding 
norms is taken up further in Section 2.2.
mm “Legally enforceable”: means that the legal norm 
is backed by procedural mechanisms that can 
mobilize various ‘disciplines’4 in order to ensure 
that States comply with their obligations (see 
Section 2.2 below). These mechanisms include 
transparency and facilitation, as well as compli-
ance and enforcement. Conversely, a legal norm 
may be legally binding but not legally enforce-
able if there are no such mechanisms to support 
and eventually ensure its implementation. This 
is the most frequent situation found in inter-
national law. The aforementioned procedural 
mechanisms may be established for the pur-
poses of promoting the implementation of pro-
visions laid down both by a legally binding in-
strument or by a non-legally binding instrument 
(for example a resolution adopted by an inter-
national organisation). However, procedural 
mechanisms in non-legally binding instruments 
tend to be weaker5.  While such mechanisms can 
contribute to strengthening the normative force 
of a resolution that is not legally binding, they 
cannot on their own give a legally binding char-
acter to such resolutions. 
2. Dictionnaire de droit international, J. Salmon, p. 629 
(our translation).
3. Dictionnaire de droit international, J. Salmon, p. 765. 
4. We use the word ‘discipline’ in the sense of an incentive 
to act in a certain way. These incentives can be positive 
or negative, reputational or material, and created 
implicitly or explicitly by the regime. 
5. See for example the role of the Commission on 
Sustainable Development in the follow up of Agenda 21.
2.2. Hard and soft law: three 
criteria of normativity
While law and non-law, or ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ 
are often presented as existing in binary opposi-
tion to one another, in reality the normative force 
of international environmental law operates 
along a spectrum.  For example, although soft law 
instruments may seem non-binding at first glance, 
in practice they can have some legal effect. States 
often take great care when negotiating such instru-
ments, and occasionally include mechanisms to 
promote the transparency and implementation 
of their actions under the soft law instrument in 
question. Such inclusions provide telling clues of 
the degree of normative force these instruments in 
reality possess. 
As regards to hard law, numerous norms are 
non-binding because they have not been written 
as prescriptive norms, or have been written using 
such generic terms that they cannot be applied 
without additional precision. This is the case for 
the vast majority of the provisions of the Rio Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, which begin either 
with: “Each contracting party shall, as far as pos-
sible, and where appropriate (…)”, or with “Each 
contracting party shall, in accordance with its par-
ticular conditions and capabilities (…)”.
The degrees of normativity and effectiveness 
of soft and hard law instruments are in fact vari-
able. The absolute divide between hard and soft, 
between binding and non-binding does not stand 
up to an in-depth analysis.6 Therefore, in order to 
assess the legal nature of an instrument, we use 
the following set of criteria:
 m A formal criteria: is the instrument embedded in 
a formal source of law or not (i.e. treaty, custo-
mary rules, general international law principles, 
unilateral acts)? How was the instrument adop-
ted? By what organ, with what authority? Ac-
cording to what decision-making process? Did 
some States express reservations? If yes, which 
States?
 m A substantive criteria: are the legal norms ex-
pressed in precise and prescriptive language? 
Or are they vague and hortatory? 
 m A procedural criteria: does the instrument 
include the capacity to mobilize relevant ‘dis-
ciplines’ in order to promote and ensure imple-
mentation of agreed norms? Such disciplines 
include a robust transparency, accountability 
and facilitation mechanism, as well as possibly a 
compliance and enforcement mechanism. 
6. See. D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance. 
The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International 
Legal System, (Oxford, OUP, 2000) 560 p.
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These criteria demonstrate the necessity of as-
sessing the instrument as a whole when determin-
ing its legal nature, on the spectrum between hard 
and soft law, binding and non-binding. 
2.3. The legal form of the 
Paris Agreement as the result 
of four key parameters
Since the Bali Conference (COP 13, 2007), Parties 
have been of the view that legal form should 
follow substance. However, it is difficult to make 
progress on substance while uncertainty remains 
on the legal form, in particular on the legally 
binding character of NDCs. 
To generate a comprehensive view, Parties 
should consider the legal form of the instrument 
to be adopted at COP21 in Paris in the light of 
four parameters that emerge from the current 
negotiations:
 m Form of the core agreement and its relationship 
to substantive contributions: although there 
is no consensus yet on the legal form, nego-
tiations seem to be heading towards a hybrid 
instrument, with a number of Parties calling 
for a “core” agreement which may be supple-
mented by other instruments.
 m ‘Anchoring’ of NDCs: the legal effect of NDCs 
may depend on the way they are ‘anchored’ in 
the Paris agreement.
 m A mechanism for transparency, accountability 
and facilitation: a mechanism to ensure trans-
parency of actions undertaken by Parties can 
help to mobilize reputational incentives, and 
thus contribute to the normative force of the 
regime; in addition, this mechanism could un-
dertake a facilitative role providing technical 
advice and mobilizing the resources of the re-
gime to assist implementation.
 m A mechanism for compliance and enforcement: 
parties may wish to create a mechanism for 
compliance and enforcement.   
These parameters and their relationship with 
the issue of legal form are summarized in figure 1
For each of these four key parameters, Parties 
can choose between different options, which en-
tail a series of trade-offs.  
This paper aims to shed some light on the pros 
and cons of the various options that Parties may 
consider regarding these four key parameters. It 
also aims to as well to highlight the inter-linkages 
between these options. We consider it important 
to optimize all four parameters in a way that 
can make the Paris agreement adequate, uni-
versal and fair, legally robust, and dynamic and 
durable. 
Figure 1. The pillars of the legal form discussion
legal form
Formal  
criteria
Substantive  
criteria
Procedural  
criteria
Form of core 
agreement
Precision an clarity 
of obligations
Transparency, 
accountability and 
facilitation
Anchoring 
of national 
contributions
Precision and  
clarity of cycle
Compliance and 
enforcement
Legal link
Source: Authors.
3. tHe leGal Form oF tHe 
core aGreemeNt
In Durban, Parties decided “to launch a process to 
develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
applicable to all Parties”.7 From a legal perspec-
tive, this mandate includes two main options 
between which Parties have to choose: a “protocol” 
or “another legal instrument or an agreed outcome 
with legal force”.
3.1. The protocol option
The “core” of the Paris agreement can take the 
form of a protocol to the Convention, the adop-
tion of which would then be governed Article 17 
of the UNFCCC. Such a protocol would be legally 
binding for all ratifying Parties according to the 
customary rule Pacta sunt servanda, embodied in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties according to its Article 26: “Every treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith”. 
The treaty form offers some advantages regard-
ing durability and robustness. Commitments en-
shrined in a treaty are not easily reversible, even 
though Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Pro-
tocol shows that it is always possible to withdraw 
from legally binding instruments.8 In order to en-
ter into force, a treaty is subject to ratification, ac-
ceptance or approval by States, and often requires 
the approbation of national parliaments. Once a 
treaty has been ratified, a state incurs immedi-
ate legal obligations in international law. It must 
conform to all the obligations set down in a treaty 
7. Decision 1/CP.17.
8. See UNFCCC article 27. 
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and cannot generally avoid them without a good 
excuse (such as force majeure) or unless it has for-
mally expressed a reservation. Most importantly, 
ratifying an international treaty gives domestic 
effect to the treaty’s provisions, thus promoting 
political ownership, stakeholder participation in 
implementation, and mobilizing the disciplines of 
domestic law. In the context of a collective action 
challenge, a robust treaty can help to overcome 
concerns about free-riding and thus potentially 
increase ambition.  
However, this form of legal instrument also en-
tails several risks and limitations. Firstly, a pro-
tocol may not incentivize ambition or wide par-
ticipation, if countries are concerned about the 
potential sovereignty costs of stringent, enforce-
able commitments. From this perspective, a proto-
col could result in a less ambitious outcome, with 
a lower level of participation, than a non-binding 
instrument such as a COP decision.  Secondly, 
States have to express their consent to be bound 
by a protocol. A protocol may run the risk of being 
ratified by a limited number of Parties only, lead-
ing to a de facto two-track system with different re-
gimes for Parties and non-Parties to the new pro-
tocol. However, such a risk may be limited if not 
managed through the possibility offered to Parties 
to make reservations or provisions in the protocol 
to accommodate their national circumstances.
3.2. The option of “another 
legal instrument or an agreed 
outcome with legal force”
In the final analysis, two options can be reason-
ably considered here: (1) a revision of the 1992 
Convention and/or its annexes, or (2) a COP deci-
sion or a set of COP decisions. From a legal point 
of view, these two options differ with regards to 
conditions for adoption, entry into force, and legal 
effect.
An amendment to the Convention can be adopt-
ed by ¾ majority, if consensus cannot be found, 
and has legal effect once it has entered into force. 
To enter into force, a substantive9 amendment to 
9. It is worth noting that the UNFCCC provides for a 
simplified procedure to allow the entry into force of 
amended annexes (by opting out and not opting in). 
However, this provision cannot be used because the 
Convention states that annexes “shall be restricted 
to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive 
nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or 
administrative character” (Article 16). A schedule 
of nationally determined contributions could form 
such an annex, but in any event it would require 
a modification of the Convention itself, at least to 
make a legal link between the new annex and Parties’ 
commitments to implement its content.
the Convention needs to be ratified by ¾ of Par-
ties, and then only enters into force for those Par-
ties that have ratified the amendment. Ratifica-
tion could be a lengthy process, with the risk that 
the amended Convention applies only to a limited 
number of Parties, while other Parties continue 
to apply the original UNFCCC. Once it enters into 
force, there is no doubt that an amendment to the 
UNFCCC would be legally binding, as is the UNF-
CCC itself. As noted earlier, however, formal bind-
ingness is not sufficient by itself to ensure norma-
tive force and effectiveness.
A COP decision requires consensus to be adopt-
ed, and can be applied immediately once adopted. 
However, the legal effect of COP decisions is am-
biguous in international public law. What COP 
decisions add in terms of flexibility and expedi-
ence, they thus lose in terms of legal security.10 
Undoubtedly, they can have a practical effect. In 
that respect, the UNFCCC provides that “the COP 
shall take, within the limits of its mandate, the nec-
essary decisions to ensure the effective application 
of the Convention”.11 
Thus, while a COP decision can have political 
force its status as a legal tool is less certain, as it 
is not automatically legally binding. Indeed, the 
extent to which COP decisions can create new le-
gal obligations, become a source of law, or allow 
a change in the interpretation of the Convention’s 
provisions remains unclear and widely debated 
among Parties.12 
In a ruling on the legal effect of resolutions of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, the 
International Court of Justice noted that “even if 
they are not binding, [they] may sometimes have 
normative value”.13 The normative force of a COP 
decision, including its degree of ‘bindingness’, de-
pends on three central factors:
1) The recognition of the capacity of the COP to 
take binding decisions: some constitutive treaties 
grant the COP the capacity to take binding deci-
sions; this capacity could also arise as the result 
of concerted practice. In this case, a COP decision 
10. Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Yann Kerbrat, Droit 
international public (Paris: Précis Dalloz, 2011), at 425.
11. UNFCCC, Article 7, our emphasis.
12. In the case Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: 
New Zealand intervening), the ICJ stated recently, 
regarding recommandations of the International 
Whaling Commission that “  these recommendations, 
which take the form of resolutions, are not binding. 
However, when they are adopted by consensus or 
by  a unanimous vote, they may be relevant for the 
interpretation of the Convention or its Schedule” 
(Judgment of 31 March 2014, § 46). 
13. International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
8 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996), §70, p. 254.
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could give rise to legal obligations, i.e. a formally 
binding act from an (almost) international legisla-
tive body.14  Such cases are limited. Furthermore, 
the UNFCCC does not provide for this capacity to 
take binding decisions for its COP.  
2) The content of the COP decision: this includes 
the precision and prescriptiveness of the decision’s 
provisions, as well as the existence of mechanisms 
or procedures to scrutinize implementation by 
Parties. There is no legal impediment to scrutiny 
of Parties’ implementation of non-legally binding 
instruments at the international level. The assess-
ment of the decision’s legal effect must be done on 
the basis of a case-by-case analysis of the content 
of the COP decision with regard to its objectives, as 
well as of the Convention’s objectives.
3) Unilateral or coordinated acceptance to be 
bound by a COP decision: a COP decision can cre-
ate a legal obligation if it is expressly accepted by 
States. Such acceptation can be made individually; 
as unilateral action by a State can be a source of 
international law. If States commit on a unilateral 
basis to apply a COP decision in a clear, precise and 
unconditional manner, they are “bound” to imple-
ment it at the international level. It is not necessary 
to provide evidence of the acceptance of the unilat-
eral act by other subjects of law. States’ acceptance 
may also be done jointly, where the treaty in ques-
tion provides for it. 
Even if it is not binding, a COP decision creates a 
new legal situation. Firstly, a State must examine 
it in good faith to the extent it reflects the opinion 
of a majority of States party to a Treaty that the 
State in question has also acceded to. Secondly, 
such a decision may contribute to the recognition 
of customary rules, and/or may be integrated later 
in the content of a treaty (this may be the case in 
the Paris agreement for some of the body of deci-
sions adopted since Copenhagen). Thirdly, for the 
purpose of applying a decision, a State can decide 
not to apply a conflicting norm that was in force 
before the adoption of the decision, if this does not 
affect the rights of other contracting Parties.
In any event, none of the three factors described 
above appears to form a sufficiently robust founda-
tion to consider COP decisions as formally binding 
by themselves under the UNFCCC. In the context 
of enhancing a multilateral, rules-based, durable 
climate regime, COP decisions may therefore be an 
inadequate legal basis. 
14. Cf. Brunee, J. (2002), “ COPing with Consent: 
Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements”, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 
1–52. 
3.3. Advantages of a 
combined approach
At this point in the run up to Paris, a majority of 
Parties have stated their preference for the adop-
tion of a legally binding instrument taking the 
form of a protocol to the UNFCCC, complemented 
by a series of COP decisions. 
This seems to be the best option to consider in 
so far as it gives the opportunity to optimize be-
tween the pros and cons of each. A protocol would 
be the most solemn and clear affirmation by States 
of their commitment to achieve the ultimate objec-
tive of the UNFCCC; as well as providing further 
legal elaboration of the procedures and institu-
tions of the regime. Such a treaty would be com-
plemented a series of COP decisions, which would 
allow a flexible and swift implementation of the 
protocol, despite the lower level of legal security 
that they provide.15 Within this multi-layer struc-
ture of the Paris agreement, the core provisions 
should be robust and durable, while the content of 
the treaty and its ambition could be progressively 
upgraded over time.16 
4. Form aND aNcHoriNG  
oF NatioNallY DetermiNeD 
coNtribUtioNS (NDcs)
4.1. What is an NDC?
The concept of NDC represents a new aspect of 
the climate regime, whose implications should be 
taken into account when considering the issue of 
legal form. We highlight several characteristics 
that are relevant for the discussion on legal form. 
Countries are currently negotiating the informa-
tion that should be provided together with NDCs in 
order to ensure that they are transparent and cred-
ible. The Paris agreement could likewise specify 
key accounting principles or options, and require 
Parties to specify how they apply accounting rules 
in their NDC. Nonetheless, it is likely that NDCs 
will remain diverse and complex. Such diversity 
reflects the problem of mitigating climate change, 
which necessitates a structural transition to a new, 
low-carbon development model. This transition 
is not just a question of ‘reducing emissions’, as 
if it were as simple as dimming a light switch. It 
15. P.-M. Dupuy et Yann Kebrat, Droit international public, 
Précis Dalloz, 12ème édition,  2014, p. 424. 
16. Like the Bonn-Marrakech agreements, a set of COP 
decisions proposed for adoption to the first COP-MOP, 
which contributed to operationalize the Protocol.
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requires concerted policy action across all sectors, 
innovation and investment in new infrastructure, 
and profound changes in the organization of pro-
duction and consumption. The transition interacts 
with ‘exogenous’ factors like economic growth, 
trade and capital flows, demography, and evolu-
tions in social norms. While it will be long-term 
and uncertain, it must happen extremely rapidly 
in comparison with other socio-economic evolu-
tions of comparable magnitude (the industrial 
revolution, for example). Finally, while presenting 
common elements, the transition will differ across 
countries depending on their circumstances, re-
sources, preferences, and levels of development. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this discus-
sion. Firstly, NDCs will reflect the diversity of coun-
tries and the complexity of the transition. Secondly, 
this observation has implications for countries’ ac-
countability toward their NDC. While countries 
should be accountable for their NDCs, it is not rea-
sonable to expect ‘to-the-ton’ accountability. Indeed, 
the Chinese and US announcements already indi-
cate this reality: they contain inevitable elements 
of ambiguity, a quantitative range in the case of the 
US (26-28% reduction by 2025), and an ambiguity 
in timeframe in the case of China (peaking around 
2030). It is likely that NDCs will be multiform, as 
indeed has been already indicated by the Chinese 
announcement (aspirational peaking range and 
non-fossil fuel share in energy supply, with poten-
tially further elements in the final announcement). 
This underscores the importance of providing space 
to differentiate the normativity of different elements 
of the NDC. Some elements could form the core of 
the NDC; some could be for information purposes.
Granted, the formal announcements, to be made 
in the spring of 2015, will likely be more precise. 
Nonetheless, we would argue that NDCs are likely 
to be diverse, multifaceted documents, framed by 
common but relatively loose rules on upfront in-
formation and accounting methods. 
Thus, accountability will inevitably take on a 
qualitative element: are countries making good 
faith efforts to implement their NDCs, with de-
monstrable progress towards achievement? To 
summarize the argument: complex problems re-
quire complex solutions; NDCs will reflect this. 
As a consequence, it will be necessary to establish 
robust, independent procedural arrangements al-
lowing for greater transparency of action toward 
the implementation of inherently diverse and com-
plex NDCs (see section 5 on transparency, account-
ability and facilitation).
There is also the question of timing, i.e. should 
NDCs be ready for anchoring in Paris or only af-
terwards (even though the INDC phase should be 
completed between Lima and Paris)? There are 
two reasons for considering a later date. Firstly, 
there is the hope that more time for a robust assess-
ment process will stimulate upward revision. Sec-
ondly, some countries have expressed the need for 
more time for the definition of accounting rules. 
Regarding the first, few countries have indicated 
a willingness to have a robust ex-ante assessment 
(see also below). Regarding the second, countries 
should indeed indicate the accounting rules that 
they plan to use, potentially based on agreed prin-
ciples and existing rule sets. However, in order to 
ensure the political signal of the Paris agreement, 
it seems necessary to have NDCs in final or nearly 
final form in Paris. If some adjustments need to be 
made subsequent to Paris, the Agreement should 
contain a provision that this be done by 2016.  
In addition to NDCs, the Paris agreement should 
contain a requirement that Parties develop and 
submit indicative long-term deep decarbonisation 
pathways. These would be legally non-binding, 
and kept separate from NDCs and other reporting 
requirements. Their purpose would be threefold. 
Firstly, they would support the iterative learn-
ing process that the regime should establish, by 
providing a long-term thinking alongside each 
round of short-term NDCs. Secondly, they would 
increase the scope for transparency, trust and dif-
ferentiation, by allowing each Party to describe 
in their own terms the opportunities, challenges 
and needs for international cooperation that 
deep decarbonisation implies for them. Thirdly, 
they would help to align expectations around the 
long-term. The Paris agreement could contain a 
requirement to develop and submit such indica-
tive pathways by 2018, to update them in line with 
each cycle; it would also specify that such path-
ways are non-binding (they could be housed in an 
INF document, for example).  
A final question relates to ambition in the dy-
namic context. Many have argued that the legal 
anchoring of NDCs needs to allow for easy updat-
ing. This is indeed valid. However, in the collective 
action problem of climate change, countries are 
very unlikely to update their NDCs unilaterally. 
Moreover, governments do not easily reverse deci-
sions once taken. This highlights the importance 
of having a legally robust, collective commitment 
in the core agreement to regular rounds (every 
5 years) of collective action. Parties should also 
commit individually to providing new or updated 
NDCs in line with this cycle. This should form a 
key part of their legal obligation under the core 
agreement. We therefore believe that legal argu-
ments about the ease of unilateral adjustments of 
NDC under different anchoring options are in fact 
secondary. The fact is that countries are unlikely 
to do so: coordinated adjustments in the context 
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of predictable cycles should form the basis of the 
so-called ratchet mechanism.
Clarifying these points upfront provides a better 
basis for judging between different options for an-
choring NDCs in the agreement. It is to this that 
we now turn.
4.2. Five options for the 
anchoring of NDCs
If the Paris agreement takes the form of a new 
protocol to the 1992 Convention, there are five 
legal options for the anchoring of NDCs. Those 
five options imply different consequences in terms 
of timing, legal force, transparency, accountability 
and non-compliance.
Figure 2 sets out the five options for the anchor-
ing of NDCs. These are then discussed in the fol-
lowing sub-sections.  
Figure 2. Five options for the anchoring of NDCs
With 
contributions 
inside
Classical annex
New  
protocol
With 
contributions 
outside
National schedule  
to be included later
Mandatory due to a reference 
in the protocol
In a COP decision
In an INF document
Source: Authors.
4.2.1. An annex or annexes to the protocol
With this option, NDCs would be inscribed in one 
or several annexes of the protocol. It could be a 
single annex bringing together all NDCs, on the 
model of the Kyoto Protocol.  However, as noted 
above, NDCs will be diverse in terms of content. 
Therefore the only possible option would seem to 
be an annex for each Party. From a practical point 
of view, a set of annexes has the disadvantage of 
resulting in an extensive text; however, nothing 
prevents it from a legal point of view. 
With this option, the annex or annexes would 
form an integral part of the protocol, and would 
have the same legal force as a legally binding 
treaty. Whether or not the NDCs are indeed legally 
enforceable depends subsequently on the substan-
tive and procedural provisions of the treaty. 
This option has several advantages. Forming 
part of a treaty, NDCs would be legally binding 
nationally for Parties to the agreement, as well as 
internationally. The annex or annexes would be 
negotiated and adopted at the same time as the 
protocol, following a minimum of coordination 
among Parties before or during the Paris confer-
ence. Indeed, the annex or annexes being part of 
the protocol, they would need to gain the consen-
sus of the COP to be adopted officially in a COP 
Decision.17 However, it is possible to introduce a 
simplified procedure to amend the annexes for the 
next round of contributions, in order to render the 
Paris agreement a dynamic instrument. This op-
tion has the added advantage of providing a robust 
legal basis to ensure transparency, accountability 
and facilitation, and to eventually enforce com-
pliance. Such provisions may be more difficult to 
introduce if NDCs are not binding internationally 
(see below).
This option has also three disadvantages. First, 
it requires that all Parties’ contributions be ready 
before the Paris Conference, in order to inscribe 
them into the annex(es) to the protocol for their 
adoption. Secondly, once the treaty is adopted, the 
approach is by definition rather rigid and not very 
flexible over time, unless a simplified revision pro-
cedure is developed.18 Thirdly, coordinated, inter-
nationally binding obligations may be difficult for 
some Parties to accept, reducing participation and 
hence effectiveness. For some, domestic ratifica-
tion of internationally binding substantive obliga-
tions may be a challenge. Others may consider this 
option to contain either too little or too much legal 
differentiation or legal symmetry. Remaining disa-
greement on this question of legal differentiation/
legal symmetry may result in a lowest common 
denominator, unless a more intermediate solution 
than this option is found.
4.2.2. A national schedule integrated in the 
protocol 
NDCs could be determined at the national level 
and inscribed into National Schedules, which 
the protocol could integrate after adoption by a 
specific provision to the effect that they form an 
integral part of the protocol. National contribu-
tions could be designed and notified to the secre-
tariat according to a loose common format and a 
17. UNFCC Article 17§1 ; see on this model the  decision 1/
CP.3. 
18. The approach used by the Montreal Protocol to review 
the annex(es) through a simplified procedure is 
exemplary. Such a procedure was adopted to adjust 
Parties’ commitments under the second period of the 
Kyoto Protocol: the adjustment “shall be considered 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol unless more than 
three-fourths of the Parties present and voting object to its 
adoption”. Moreover, its entry into force is automatic. It 
does not need States’ ratification, a process inherently 
long and uncertain. See Article 3 §1 quater of the Kyoto 
Protocol as amended in Doha in 2012. 
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uniform terminology, while allowing Parties to 
self-differentiate their commitments by type and 
scope. National schedules could also indicate 
restrictions, exemptions or even conditions for the 
implementation of the NDC. 
Drawing on the model of national schedules 
in the General Agreement on Trade in Servic-
es (GATS), this option differs from the previous 
option in that national contributions are not part 
of the protocol at the time of its adoption.19 NDCs 
could be notified after the Paris Conference in or-
der to reflect the principles and rules of the Paris 
agreement and be automatically integrated into 
the protocol, without being subject to other Par-
ties’ acceptance. 
Less constraining in terms of timing, this op-
tion offers more flexibility while providing for 
the same binding legal force to NDCs than if they 
were introduced in an annex at the time of adop-
tion. Once notified and forming part of the treaty, 
contributions would be implemented according to 
the treaty, in particular to its provisions on trans-
parency, accountability and compliance. National 
Schedules could be valid for one cycle of collective 
action, as provided for in the protocol. In this case, 
Parties would have to decide if and under what 
conditions States could modify their contribu-
tions. A complete freedom, even to review down-
ward the ambition of their NDCs, is theoretically 
possible. But this could be prevented by introduc-
ing the “no backsliding” principle. 
4.2.3. NDCs outside the protocol but binding 
due to a provision in the protocol
NDCs could also exist outside the protocol, for 
example in a registry kept by the secretariat on 
the model of the INF document in which the secre-
tariat compiled Parties’ “pledges” communicated 
after Copenhagen. But the protocol would contain 
the legal obligation for all Parties to submit a 
national contribution and to implement it. States 
could have an obligation of result (to achieve the 
pre-determined result) or, more reasonably, an 
obligation of means (to use their best endeavours 
to achieve the result). This, in a nutshell, is the 
spirit of a recent AILAC submission20, a proposal 
which merits serious consideration by Parties. As 
Parties would be internationally bound by an obli-
gation to implement their national contribution, 
19. See also Article 10§1 of the Vienna Convention on the 
ozone layer (1985). 
20. Independent Association of Latin America and 
the Caribbean AILAC Ad-Hoc Working Group on 
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), 
Submission on the legal architecture and structure of 
the elements of the 2015 Agreement, http://tinyurl.
com/qfz2wfq, consulté le 28 octobre 2014.
this option would help balance legal security at 
international level and national sovereignty to 
determine NDCs. It could also create the legal 
basis for a more robust regime for transparency, 
accountability and facilitation, based on this inter-
national legal obligation for each Party to imple-
ment its NDC.
As with the option of National Schedules, this 
option would allow flexible timing for some ad-
justments post-Paris. It would also allow the 
simple updating of NDC during each subsequent 
round of collective action (or unilaterally if Parties 
so wish).
4.2.4. Anchoring in a COP decision
The protocol can provide that initial NDCs, as 
well as any revised or new NDCs, be adopted by 
COP/MOP decisions. In comparison to option iii) 
above, the protocol would not contain a provision 
requiring Parties to implement their NDC (obli-
gation of means). In order to operationalize this 
approach and make it effective by 2020, the COP 
to the UNFCCC could prepare this decision to be 
endorsed at COP/MOP1 of the new protocol (if the 
new agreement is a protocol).21 
As discussed above in this paper, COP and COP/
MOP decisions are legal instruments, but not nec-
essarily legally binding by themselves. They can 
have some legal effects even without having the 
same legal force as a treaty. Parties should apply 
COP and COP/MOP decisions in good faith as im-
plementing measures of the international treaty 
they have agreed to approve. In addition, if the 
protocol provides for it, NDCs inscribed in COP/
MOP decisions could be subject to both an ex-ante 
assessment on the basis of upfront information, 
and an assessment of progress made by Parties 
in their implementation. In the absence of an in-
ternational commitment to implement the NDC, 
this assessment of implementation would likely be 
weaker. With this option a State cannot be held li-
able for non-compliance if it does not make efforts 
to implement its NDC. 
4.2.5. Anchoring in an INF document
With this last option, NDCs would be compiled 
in an “INF” document and/or in a registry main-
tained by the Secretariat, on the model of the 
21. The approach used by the Montreal Protocol to 
review the annex(es) through a simplified procedure 
is exemplary. Such a procedure was adopted by the 
Kyoto Protol to adjust Parties’ commitments under 
the second commitment period: the adjustment “shall 
be considered adopted by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
unless more than three-fourths of the Parties present and 
voting object to its adoption”.
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compilation of pledges made by Parties after 
Copenhagen-Cancun.22 In comparison to option 
iii) above, the protocol would not contain a provi-
sion requiring Parties to implement their NDC 
(obligation of means). The protocol could refer 
to NDCs while encouraging all Parties to take 
measures to implement them and contribute to 
the achievement of a long-term collective goal.  In 
that case, such contributions would have no legal 
force at the international level. In the absence of 
an international obligation to implement the NDC, 
it becomes difficult to envisage strong mecha-
nisms for transparency, accountability and facilita-
tion, let alone for enforcing compliance. Implicit 
naming and shaming would therefore be the only 
international discipline available for supporting 
Parties’ implementation of the protocol.
5. traNSPareNcY, accoUNtabilitY 
aND FacilitatioN
5.1. Key concepts and the role 
of transparency in legal form 
With contributions determined at the national 
level, transparency, accountability and facili-
tation become a cornerstone of the post 2020 
regime. Transparency and accountability are key 
to reciprocity and trust, and therefore to making 
the Paris agreement an effective instrument.
As noted in section 2 above, transparency and 
accountability are an important aspect of legal 
form, relating to the substantive and procedural 
criteria that can be used to judge the legal force of 
an instrument. The precision of NDCs, achieved 
through agreed ex ante information standards 
and accounting principles and rules, will be a 
key aspect of their substantive force. However, as 
discussed above, NDCs will likely remain diverse 
and complex. Therefore, processes to track and 
promote implementation become all the more 
important.  
Transparency and accountability are not a sub-
stitute for the formal legal bindingness of the core 
agreement or NDCs. Indeed, a central argument 
of this paper is that the absence of formal legal 
bindingness would make developing a strong re-
gime for transparency and accountability more 
difficult (if states do not consent to be bound to 
22. One could think for example to the Register/
compendium of voluntary commitments « volontaires » 
in the follow-up of Rio + 20 (see www.uncsd2012.org/
commit ). Option supported by the United States in 
their September submission, p. 10. 
implement their NDCs, why develop a robust re-
gime for promoting implementation?). However, 
transparency, accountability and facilitation of 
implementation are crucial pillars of the overall 
legal form and legal effect of the Paris agreement, 
and thus warrant greater attention in the negotia-
tions than has hitherto been the case.
Here we set out some key concepts and theo-
retical frameworks that inform the discussion 
of transparency and accountability in the Paris 
agreement taken up in subsequent sections of the 
paper:
mm Transparency of emissions: this relates to 
the measurement, reporting and verifica-
tion (MRV) of accurate and timely emissions 
inventories. 
mm Transparency of NDCs: this relates to the provi-
sion of sufficient upfront information with the 
submission of NDCs, in order to ensure that 
these are as transparent as possible in terms 
of expected emissions outcomes. It includes 
the development and application of agreed ac-
counting principles and rules, in particular on 
land use and markets. We can include under 
this point both substantive rules (on upfront in-
formation, for example) as well as procedures 
intended to increase the transparency of targets 
(through ex ante consultation, for example). 
Transparency of targets can also facilitate the 
assessment of the adequacy of aggregated miti-
gation efforts towards achieving the 2 degrees 
target, as well as the equity of individual NDCs. 
mm Transparency of implementation: this relates to 
the provision of information on and assessment 
of demonstrable progress towards the achieve-
ment of NDCs, and the multilateral determina-
tion of achievement subsequent to the end of 
the period.
mm Accountability: we group what is often termed 
‘compliance’ under the broader term ‘account-
ability’. A regime has multiple ‘disciplines’ that 
can be mobilized, implicitly or explicitly, to 
help promote and ensure implementation of le-
gal obligations. These range from reputational 
incentives and assistance, material incentives, 
to enforcement mechanisms such as sanctions. 
In order for such disciplines to be explicitly 
mobilized, Parties need to be explicitly ac-
countable for the implementation of their legal 
obligations, and the regime needs to have the 
capacity to explicitly determine demonstrable 
progress or successful implementation.
Despite significant improvements in the trans-
parency framework since the adoption of the Can-
cun Agreements, there is still room for strengthen-
ing this framework in several important respects. 
working paper 15/20141 4 IddrI
A comprehensive assessment of options for the legal form of the Paris Climate Agreement 
5.2. Potential objectives of the 
transparency framework
The primary objective of the transparency frame-
work should be to build trust, reciprocity, and 
reputational incentives to implement Parties’ 
commitments. These reputational incentives can 
be implicit or explicit, depending on the extent to 
which the transparency framework allows for a 
technical determination on implementation.
The second objective should be to put in place 
positive incentives and to facilitate implementa-
tion. The transparency framework should help 
mobilize positive incentives, which may be rep-
utational (i.e. the creation of a ‘race to the top’ 
to showcase action, etc.), or material, for exam-
ple the mobilization of resources or expertise 
for countries having good faith difficulties with 
implementation. 
The third objective should be to develop poli-
cy learning and alignment of expectations: the 
transparency regime can reveal and share best 
practice and help to align expectations about pol-
icies, enabling the more effective and rapid diffu-
sion of policy expertise and confidence, including 
to the private sector. From that perspective, the 
transparency framework can also help to opera-
tionalize the “no backsliding” principle,
The fourth objective could be to provide an in-
put to collective action in the subsequent cycle 
of commitments. By revealing information on 
implementation and facilitating policy learning, 
the transparency regime can support subsequent 
rounds of collective action, as well as potentially 
identify and help solve problems with the devel-
opment of subsequent contributions. 
Finally, a fifth objective could be, after a com-
mitment cycle, to provide factual inputs to a com-
pliance regime if Parties chose to introduce one in 
the Paris agreement (see section 6).
These objectives could be translated into gen-
eral principles of transparency in the Paris agree-
ment itself, to pave the way for the adoption of 
modalities and procedures, including institution-
al arrangements before the agreement becomes 
effective by 2020.
5.3. Nature, scope and timing of 
the transparency framework
The transparency framework should be technical 
in nature, monitoring progress towards achieve-
ment of Parties’ contributions. It should be 
informed by science and available data, be non-
confrontational, non-punitive, non-intrusive, and 
respectful of Parties’ national sovereignty. Trans-
parency of implementation should be based on 
information provided by Parties, while taking into 
account upfront information they have provided 
to define and support their NDC, including the 
description of relevant national circumstances. 
When looking at existing requirements for 
the elaboration and submission of biennial re-
ports (BR) by developed country Parties and 
biennial updated reports (BUR) by developing 
country Parties, there is some room for improve-
ment to increase transparency of Parties’ mitiga-
tion actions and their effects. To this end, existing 
reporting requirements should be improved and 
streamlined, in particular to include more robust 
projections of emissions pathways, more detailed 
information on policy design, priorities and na-
tional circumstances, as well as further indicators 
of progress on implementation. It is important to 
underscore the reporting implications of address-
ing a complex, long-term problem like climate 
change. Understanding progress on implementa-
tion, as well as taking into account the evolution of 
national circumstances relevant for implementa-
tion, requires reporting and assessment that goes 
beyond looking merely at GHG outcomes. The 
reporting regime should be extended to include 
further data on policy inputs and intermediate 
outcomes such as investments, R&D and progress 
on sectoral indicators of decarbonisation. 
The Paris agreement should reflect the core 
principles, institutions and modalities of the 
transparency framework. Detailed improvement 
of existing transparency arrangements can start 
at COP 22, in line with the core principles defined 
in the Paris agreement. They should be finalized 
by 2018 in order to apply to the last biannual re-
ports due before 2020. 
The transparency framework should apply 
equally to all Parties in terms of frequency and 
intensity, while taking into account the self-
differentiation made by Parties when determin-
ing their NDCs, notably by type of commitment 
and the description of relevant national circum-
stances. Some flexibility should be given to de-
veloping country Parties in terms of accuracy 
of emissions measurement (tiers 1 to 3, use of 
default emission factors) if they do not have the 
capacity or the data to apply the more stringent 
requirements. Additional flexibility may be given 
to developing country Parties in terms of conse-
quences further to the determination of problems 
of implementation.
In order to deliver the various objectives pro-
posed above, the transparency framework should 
be conducted on a regular timeline, so as to feed 
into the development of the next cycle of NDCs, 
and to assess collective action. The frequency 
of existing reporting requirements through 
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biannual reports23 fits with a length of a 5-year 
cycle of contributions. 
5.4. Possible institutional 
arrangements
The process to ensure transparency of implemen-
tation should be separate from the assessment 
of adequacy prior to each commitment cycle. In 
addition, it should be separate from the process 
related to ex  post determination of compliance 
after the given commitment period. The objective 
of the transparency mechanism is to be forward 
looking and to provide independent, technical 
assessment of progress towards the achievement 
of NDCs. 
Finance and adaptation have their own dedicat-
ed institutional arrangements: the Standing Com-
mittee on Finance and the Adaptation Committee. 
A dedicated new institutional arrangement is re-
quired to ensure transparency on the implementa-
tion of mitigation NDCs. This new body must have 
a high technical competence, independence from 
day-to-day negotiations, and the institutional 
capacity to undertake detailed interactions with 
Parties in order to understand their progress to-
wards their NDC. A permanent transparency in-
stitution would be a core aspect of the post 2020 
regime. Its functions would be as follows:
mm Provide technical support and guidance to par-
ties on mitigation (the institutional arrange-
ments for finance, adaptation and technology 
can have a similar function in their respective 
domains).
mm Share relevant information, knowledge, experi-
ence and good practices on transparency.
mm Determine progress towards the implementa-
tion of NDCs and signal potential problems of 
implementation. 
Therefore, we propose that the Paris agreement 
establish a new body: a Committee for the Trans-
parency and Recognition of Mitigation Action. 
Such a Committee should work on the basis of 
special arrangements regarding its relationships 
with the COP/MOP (if the Paris agreement is a 
protocol) and other institutions under the Con-
vention, like the Green Climate Fund. 
The Transparency Committee could have two 
separate branches (or panels), each being gov-
erned by its own mandate and processes:
 m A branch/panel working on transparency of 
individual implementation. Its composition and 
23. Parties shall submit BRs and BURs every two years, 
with the first BR due on January 1, 2014, and the first 
BUR by December 2014.
expertise should build upon the existing arran-
gements (e.g. roster of experts, Expert Review 
Teams, Technical Team of Experts, Consultative 
Group of Experts). Its mandate should allow 
technical experts to assess the performance of im-
plementing measures in the light of their effects 
on the basis of improved reporting requirements 
and processes as discussed above. A key weakness 
of the current system is that there is no inde-
pendent, explicit determination of problems of 
implementation. In this regard, different options 
can be considered on how to follow up the techni-
cal assessment made by this transparency panel:
 m The panel submits the report on individual 
implementation to all Parties via the Secre-
tariat, or 
 m The panel submits a synthesis report via 
the Secretariat covering all Parties but 
highlighting questions of implementation 
encountered by individual Parties
 m A branch/panel working on the adequacy of col-
lective action in line with the long term goal. The 
panel would prepare every four years a report 
based on the compilation of proposed future 
contributions that would be submitted to all Par-
ties via the Secretariat, which would organize a 
consultative process to discuss about the level of 
collective ambition. The 2013-2015 review process 
could inspire Parties to establish such a consulta-
tive procedure in a more institutionalized way. 
6. coNSeQUeNceS oF 
NoN-comPliaNce
6.1. Non-compliance in 
the existing regime
Before addressing the potential consequences of 
non-compliance within the Paris agreement, it is 
important to recall the current consequences in 
cases of non-compliance with the UNFCCC, the 
Kyoto Protocol, and the Cancun agreements.
6.1.1. Consequences of non-compliance with 
the UNFCCC
“In the event of a dispute between any two or more 
Parties concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of the Convention” the Convention contains a 
dispute settlement clause in its Article 14: 
mm “the Parties concerned shall seek a settlement 
of the dispute through negotiation or any other 
peaceful means of their own choice”;
mm an optional clause for compulsory jurisdiction 
of  the International Court of Justice or arbitra-
tion (under conditions of reciprocity) ;
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mm by default, a conciliation commission which 
“shall render a recommendatory award, which 
the parties shall consider in good faith”. 
Such a provision has, however, never been used. 
For several reasons, the Parties are very reluc-
tant to accept a compulsory jurisdiction—only 
the Netherlands has done so for both the ICJ and 
arbitration, and the Solomon Islands for arbitra-
tion. Because of the requirement of reciprocity, 
only a dispute between the Netherlands and the 
Solomon Islands could lead to a settlement under 
Article 14, taking the form of arbitration. Of course 
the Parties to a dispute can still agree to bring the 
matter before the ICJ or an arbitration tribunal 
after the dispute has arisen and only for this dis-
pute. But this remains exceptional, in particular 
for a multilateral dispute, even if international law 
permits it.24 
In addition to Article 14, the Convention provides 
for a Multilateral Consultative Process (MCP) un-
der Article 13. The MCP has been established by the 
COP in the form of a set of procedures (Decision 
10/CP.4). Its objective was to resolve questions re-
garding the implementation of the Convention, by 
providing advice and assistance to Parties to over-
come difficulties encountered in their implemen-
tation of the Convention, promoting understand-
ing of the Convention and preventing disputes. 
The process was designed to be conducted in a fa-
cilitative, cooperative, non-confrontational, trans-
parent and timely manner, and be non-judicial, 
separate from, and without prejudice to, the provi-
sions of Article 14 of the Convention (Settlement 
of Disputes). In the Annex to Decision 10/CP.4, the 
terms of reference given for such process provide 
that questions regarding the implementation may 
be raised, with supporting information, by either 
a Party with respect to its own implementation, or 
a group of Parties with respect to their own imple-
mentation, or a Party or a group of Parties with 
respect to the implementation by another Party or 
group of Parties. Because Parties could not reach 
consensus on the composition of the designated 
24. See the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, 2001 
(art. 48), and the commentaries of the ILC (Draft articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries, 2001, p. 126). See also the 2011 
advisory opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the 
ITLOS which elaborates on the work of the ILC stating 
that « Each State Party may also be entitled to claim 
compensation in light of the erga omnes character of the 
obligations relating to preservation of the environment 
of the high seas and in the Area » (about the Montego 
Bay Convention). ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of February 
1 2011, Case N°17, Responsibilities and Obligations of 
States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
Activities in the Area, § 180.
Committee in charge of conducting the proce-
dures, the MCP has never been operational.
6.1.2. Consequences of non-compliance with 
the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol gave birth to a very elabo-
rate compliance mechanism aiming “to facilitate, 
promote and enforce compliance with the commit-
ments under the Protocol”.  It is a non-contentious 
procedure of control of compliance and reaction 
to non-compliance.25 This procedure operates 
without prejudice to the more classical dispute 
resolution clause of the Article 14 of the Conven-
tion (see above) which applies mutatis mutandis 
to the Protocol.26 
The first non-compliance procedure of an en-
vironmental treaty was drawn up in 1990 in the 
framework of the Montreal Protocol on substances 
that deplete the ozone layer (1987). This pioneer-
ing procedure has already been taken up and 
adapted by a dozen other environmental conven-
tions, becoming little by little a standard practice. 
Although inspired by the same model, all these 
procedures have peculiarities of their own. 
Among them, the Kyoto Protocol has given rise 
to the most comprehensive non-compliance pro-
cedure to date. The importance of the environ-
mental issues at stake and the specificity of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which uses market mechanisms, 
explain the rigour of its compliance mechanism. 
The monitoring and control procedure is very ro-
bust and precise. Divided into two branches, a fa-
cilitative branch and an enforcement branch, the 
Compliance Committee is quasi-judicial. Potential 
sanctions are essentially intended to be dissuasive. 
But the “consequences” are not punitive; they aim 
at “the restoration of compliance to ensure environ-
mental integrity, and shall provide for an incentive 
to comply”. Appeal to the COP-MOP is provided 
against a decision of the enforcement branch.
But despite being very sophisticated, the system 
is not fool-proof. Notably, Canada’s withdrawal 
from the Kyoto Protocol has recently shown how 
the Committee is powerless to cope with non-com-
pliance.27 This highlights the inherent weakness 
of international environmental law to provide for 
the enforcement of state obligations against their 
will. Perhaps more importantly, the inability of 
the compliance mechanism to alert to the evident 
25. See Decision 27/CMP.1 Procedures and mechanisms 
relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol.
26. See son article 19.
27. See Compliance Committee, CC/EB/25/2014/2 20 
August 2014 Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol and its effects on Canada’s reporting obligations 
under the Protocol, Note by the secretariat.
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problems of implementation Canada was expe-
riencing before withdrawing highlights another 
weakness. This weakness should be fixed in future 
arrangements.
6.1.3. Consequences of non-compliance with 
the Cancun Agreements
The Cancun agreements consist of a set of COP deci-
sions adopted in Cancun (2010), and completed in 
Durban (2011), Doha (2012), and Warsaw (2013), 
in the wake of the Copenhagen agreement. Their 
scope is extensive, covering adaptation, mitiga-
tion, finance and technology. By themselves, the 
Cancun agreements do not create new interna-
tional obligations (at most they specify obligations 
under the Convention). Thus, regarding mitiga-
tion, pledges made by the Parties are not interna-
tionally mandatory; they are compiled in a simple 
INF document.
However, their implementation is subject to a 
transparency regime. But in case of non-compli-
ance, there are no consequences, except a shaming 
if the assessment process implicitly reveals prob-
lems of implementation. Furthermore, there is no 
compliance committee. A sanction would not be 
consistent with the non-binding character of Can-
cun pledges. The system puts the stress rather on 
implicit reputational incentives, and to a lesser de-
gree on technical and financial assistance, to pro-
mote implementation. 
6.2. Consequences of non-
compliance with the Paris 
Agreement: options and issues
6.2.1. Mandatory substantive obligations: 
if NDCs are inscribed in a protocol or 
recognized as mandatory by the protocol
This option allows the design of a non-compliance 
mechanism, potentially largely based on the multi-
lateral determination of compliance and facilita-
tive and reputational incentives.28 A more flexible 
procedure, one that is mainly based on facilita-
tion and incentives such as that of the Montreal 
Protocol, would probably be more adapted to the 
current views of Parties. Sanctions could however 
be envisaged as a last resort, or be developed in a 
subsequent iteration of the regime. 
The scope of the procedure would have to be de-
termined: would it go beyond mitigation, including 
for example finance and adaptation? Many Parties 
28. Few Parties to defend the maintenance of the Kyoto 
compliance committee in its two branches. See 
however Submission by Nepal on behalf of the Least 
Developed Countries Group on the ADP Co-Chairs’ Non 
Paper of 7 July 2014 on Parties Views and Proposal on the 
Elements for a Draft Negotiating Text, p. 8 ss. 
take the view that compliance should apply only to 
specific mitigation commitments.29 Furthermore, 
would developed and developing Parties be sub-
ject to the same legal obligation from this point 
of view? In addition, Parties would have to think 
about the practical and institutional articulation 
between the work of the Compliance Committee 
and the Transparency Mechanism (Section 5). Fi-
nally, they would have to determine the decision-
making procedures. Who is going to decide? The 
COP-MOP? The Committee? An ad hoc panel as in 
the WTO model? 
6.2.2. Non-mandatory substantive 
obligations: if NDCs are compiled in a COP-
MOP decision or an INF document
In the event of a short protocol that lays down the 
basic principles, and refers to a COP-MOP deci-
sions or an INF document containing NDCs, it 
appears quite difficult if not useless to design a 
robust compliance mechanism. Why elaborate a 
hard mechanism to control the implementation 
of a soft law instrument? One option is that such 
a mechanism be designed to control compliance 
with other provisions of the protocol (for example, 
procedural or MRV provisions—see section 6.2.3), 
in order to solidify a fragile system. 
In any event, the COP-MOP could monitor and 
review the implementation of NDCs. It could 
elaborate on the work of a transparency commit-
tee or, as a minimum, on a report prepared by the 
secretariat based on the transparency procedures 
(see section 5). But in this case, no sanctions are 
possible, not even explicit shaming by the trans-
parency mechanism. Assisting States in difficulty 
remains a possibility. This would require a proce-
dure and an institution akin to a compliance com-
mittee, albeit with a different name, for example, 
an implementation committee. If NDCs are housed 
in an INF document, the transparency mechanism 
would have even less capacity to explicitly deter-
mine non-implementation of an NDC. Such was 
the configuration of the Cancun agreements.
6.2.3. Compliance with procedural 
obligations
It should be noted that the question of compli-
ance goes beyond NDCs. The protocol may contain 
largely procedural obligations to implement an 
29. See for example Independent Association of Latin 
America and the Caribbean AILAC Ad-Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP), Submission on the legal architecture and 
structure of the elements of the 2015 Agreement, http://
tinyurl.com/qfz2wfq, précité, consulté le 28 octobre 2014. 
« Committed contributions on adaptation would not be 
subject to the Compliance Mechanism » (§78).
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NDC (option three described in section 4). At a 
lower level of legal force, it may merely contain 
a procedural obligation to have an NDC and 
to respect the relevant reporting and transpar-
ency rules. It may also contain an obligation to 
update the NDC every negotiation cycle (every 
5 years). The more the obligations of the protocol 
are reduced to procedural ones, the more compli-
ance with such procedural obligations becomes 
important. This would particularly be the case 
regarding the operationalization of the idea of a 
five year negotiation cycle, and the no backsliding 
principle. There should be a stringent compli-
ance mechanism with enforceable consequences 
(suspension of participation in the regime) for 
non-compliance with key procedural require-
ments, like the requirement to update one’s NDC 
in line with the agreed cycle.  
7. coNclUSioN
This paper has discussed the issues and options for 
the legal form of the new climate agreement to be 
adopted in Paris 2015. Several key messages can be 
distilled from the discussion:
mm There is a need for early clarity and a compre-
hensive approach to the issue of legal form, 
based around the four parameters assessed 
here, namely (1) the form of the core agreement 
and the legal link with NDCs; (2) the anchor-
ing of NDCs; (3) the mechanism for transpar-
ency, accountability and facilitation; and (4) the 
mechanism for compliance. 
mm Consensus appears to be emerging around the 
use of a hybrid legal structure, with some ele-
ments in the core agreement and some in as-
sociated implementing documents. This can be 
a useful structure for balancing credibility and 
durability with flexibility and dynamism. At a 
minimum, the core agreement should contain 
a legal obligation to implement an NDC, and to 
update it every five years in line with the agreed 
cycle of negotiations. 
mm NDCs are a new element of the climate regime, 
the consequences of which need to be taken into 
account. In keeping with the complex nature of 
the climate change problem, NDCs are likely to 
be diverse, multifaceted documents, framed by 
common but relatively loose rules on upfront 
information and accounting methods. This un-
derscores the need for a robust mechanism for 
transparency, accountability and facilitation.
mm The transparency, accountability, and facilita-
tion mechanism must form the core of the Paris 
agreement. It should have independent institu-
tional capacity and a technical mandate to track 
progress, identify problems, and provide sup-
port and guidance both to the implementation 
of NDCs and the preparation of NDCs for sub-
sequent rounds. The mechanism should be able 
to signal individual problems of implementation 
ahead of time (i.e. an early warning system). 
This mechanism should have a separate branch 
for the assessment of collective adequacy prior 
to the commencement of each cycle. 
mm Parties may wish to include a compliance mech-
anism in the new agreement. Such a mecha-
nism should be separate from the mechanism 
on transparency, accountability and facilitation, 
both as regards to its institutional structure and 
its mandate. Given the current stage of global 
cooperation, it seems unlikely (and potentially 
undesirable) that countries will agree to a puni-
tive compliance mechanism. However, a politi-
cal mechanism could be put in place to discuss 
egregious cases of non-compliance after the end 
of each cycle. There should be, however, a ro-
bust enforcement mechanism for core procedur-
al obligations relating to the submission, updat-
ing and reporting of NDCs. Such a mechanism is 
a crucial element to operationalize the concept 
of a dynamic and durable agreement operating 
on regular predictable cycles of strengthened 
action. This in turn is key to the political and 
legal signal of credibility that Paris must send. 
mm From this perspective, one relevant option to 
consider would be the reactivation and im-
provement of the Multilateral Consultative Pro-
cess as a way of activating a separate facilitative 
compliance mechanism under the UNFCCC.30 
The Paris core Agreement could include a man-
date to work this out before 2020 and provide 
guidance. In particular, there should be a link 
between the Transparency Mechanism and the 
facilitative compliance approach by allowing 
the implementation branch of the Transparency 
Committee, as much as Parties, to trigger the 
procedure on the basis of technical assessments 
of implementation problems. ❚
30. Sebastian Oberthur, “Options for a Compliance 
Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement”, Climate 
Law, 4 (2014) 30-49.
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